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Personal Liability Applies When A Corporation
Fails To Pay Wages Due Under The FLSA
493 F.3d 26 (1st
Cir. 2007)
United States
Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
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ELAINE L. CHAO, Secretary of Labor,
United States Department of Labor,
Plaintiff, Appellee,
v.
HOTEL OASIS, INC., d/b/a PARADOR OASIS;
LIONEL LUGO-RODRÍGUEZ, Individually and as President
of Hotel Oasis, Inc.,
Defendants, Appellants.
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APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Daniel R. Domínguez, U.S. District Judge]
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Before
Torruella, Circuit Judge,
Selya and Cyr, Senior Circuit Judges.
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Mauricio
Hernández-Arroyo, for appellants.
Mary J.
Rieser, Attorney, U.S. Department of Labor, Office of the Solicitor, Fair
Labor Standards Division, with whom Jonathan L. Snare, Acting Solicitor
of Labor, Steven J. Mandel, Associate Solicitor, and Paul L. Frieden,
Counsel for Appellate Litigation, were on brief, for appellee.
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June 28, 2007
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TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge. This case arises from an investigation
of defendant-appellant Hotel Oasis, Inc. ("Oasis") by the Wage
and Hour Division of the U.S. Department of Labor. The district court
found multiple minimum wage and overtime violations, and entered judgment
against Oasis and its president. The employers appeal the district
court's judgment, alleging error in the court's failure to set aside a
stipulation entered prior to trial, its conclusion that Oasis's president
is personally liable as an employer, and its discretionary decision to
award liquidated damages. We affirm on all grounds.
I. Background
Oasis
operates a hotel and restaurant facility in southwestern Puerto Rico. Defendant-appellant Dr. Lionel
Lugo-Rodríguez ("Lugo")
is the president of the corporation, runs the hotel, and manages its
employees. Oasis's records and employee testimony show that between
October 3, 1990 and June 30, 1993, Oasis had been investigated twice
before, and violations of minimum wage and overtime laws had been found
on both occasions. Oasis agreed both times to pay the back wages and
comply in the future.
Employees were paid less than minimum wage, were not paid for
training time or meetings held during non-working hours, were paid in
cash "off the books," and were not paid appropriately for
overtime. Oasis also maintained two sets of payroll records for the same
employees, covering the same time periods, one showing fewer hours at a
higher rate, and the other showing more hours at a sub-minimum wage rate.
Oasis contends that two sets of books were necessary, one for temporary
employees and one for permanent employees.
On
April 5, 1994, the Secretary of Labor (the "Secretary") filed a
complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto
Rico against Oasis and Lugo (collectively, "Defendants"),
alleging violations of the minimum wage, overtime, and record keeping
provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C.
§§ 215-216. The Secretary also sought liquidated damages pursuant to §
216(c), and a permanent injunction pursuant to § 217, enjoining Oasis
from further violations of the FLSA. In their answer to the complaint,
Defendants raised an affirmative defense that the FLSA did not apply to
Oasis because Oasis's "annual dollar value" ("ADV")
was less than $500,000. See 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(1)(a).
On
February 9, 1996, during a pre-trial conference, Jorge Sala, then-counsel
for Oasis, stipulated that Oasis had an ADV of at least $500,000 per year
from April 1, 1991 to October 1, 1995 (the "Sala Stipulation").
The minutes for that conference stated that Defendants "with draw
the ADV defense." The minutes were amended on April 22, 1996, to
reflect that Defendants "waive[d] the ADV defense though the third
quarter of 1995."
In exchange, the Secretary
agreed that Oasis was in compliance with the FLSA thereafter. Defendants
point out that discovery had not been concluded at the time Sala entered
the stipulation, and that Defendants had refused to execute a similar
stipulation mailed to them ten weeks earlier by counsel for the
Secretary. On July 18, 1996, Sala filed a motion to withdraw as counsel,
and Defendants hired a new attorney.
During
a September 6, 1996 telephone status conference, Defendants attempted to
renew their ADV defense, apparently claiming that Sala did not have the
authority to enter into the stipulation. Defendants' reasoning is gleaned
from a May 15, 2002 order in which the district court indicated that
prior to June 1997, Defendants had relied solely
on Sala's lack of authorization as grounds for setting aside the
stipulation.
On
September 16, 1996, the district court issued an order reaffirming the
Sala Stipulation and stating that the stipulation would not be set aside
absent "the most extraordinary extenuating and grievous
circumstances."
At a
June 1997 pre-trial conference, Defendants asserted for the first time
that the Sala Stipulation was based on a computational mistake. The
district court once again upheld the stipulation, ruling that the
Secretary could rely on the stipulation to meet its burden to prove FLSA
coverage, but that Defendants would be allowed to adduce evidence at
trial to prove that Oasis's ADV was less than $500,000 for the relevant
periods.
A bench trial began on June 23,
1997. After five successive days, the trial was continued for over two
years, resuming on February 7, 2000. On July 13, 1998, more than a year
after the trial commenced, Defendants submitted a motion for summary
judgment, which included expert affidavits concluding that Oasis did not
meet the ADV threshold. The district court refused to entertain the
motion for summary judgment because it was submitted well after the trial
began. In addition, the court precluded Defendants from introducing the
accompanying expert testimony at trial because "[n]either the expert nor the report [was] identified and
disd to Plaintiff before the trial commenced."
At
trial in February 2000, Defendants attempted to introduce Rule 1006
summaries,
Federal Rule of Evidence 1006 provides in full:
"The contents of voluminous writings, recordings, or photographs
which cannot conveniently be examined in court may be presented in the
form of a chart, summary, or calculation. The originals, or duplicates,
shall be made available for examination or copying, or both, by other
parties at reasonable time and place. The court may order that they be
produced in court." which purported to show that Oasis's ADV was
less than $500,000 for some of the periods covered by the Sala
Stipulation. The Secretary's counsel objected on several grounds over the
course of the trial, including that the summaries were inadmissible
because they were based on hearsay, and that he had not been provided the
summaries before trial and therefore could not concede their numerical
accuracy. For these reasons, the district court refused to admit the
summaries at that point. Instead, after testimony was concluded on all
subjects other than the ADV, the court adjourned the trial, giving
Defendants thirty days to comply with Rule 1006 and the Secretary another
sixty days to review the data and develop her position.
The
trial was continued several times thereafter. On October 19, 2000, the
Secretary filed a memorandum in support of her motion to preclude
Defendants from presenting evidence contrary to the Sala Stipulation.
Defendants never formally opposed the motion, and on May 15, 2002, the
district court granted the motion. The court explained that it had given
Defendants "an opportunity to demonstrate that the Sala Stipulation
was wrong," but that "the record is bereft of any solid
argument developed by Oasis which may point to 'extraordinary extenuating
or grievous circumstance[s]' which might justify setting the Sala Stipulation
aside." With no evidence of "a clear manifest injustice,"
the court held Defendants to the stipulation based on the long-standing
principle that a party is bound by its attorney's actions.
On June
28, 2002, having reaffirmed the Sala Stipulation, the district court
nevertheless offered Defendants an alternative way to submit the Rule
1006 summaries in lieu of an evidentiary hearing: "[the parties]
shall file a joint proffer of evidence or offer of proof, to preclude the
necessity of the hearing; it shall be akin to a book of evidence that is
offered, albeit not admitted." Although the court's May 15, 2002
order holding Defendants to the Sala Stipulation was final, the court
felt that the proffered evidence would give the Court of Appeals a
complete record on which to decide the ADV issue on the merits.
A year
later, on June 20, 2003, the district court entered an order granting the
Secretary's unopposed motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of
Lugo's
personal liability as an employer under the FLSA. The motion had been
granted during a pre-trial conference on June 11, 1997, after hearing the
parties' positions on the issue. The parties were aware of the court's
decision but the order had not been entered into the docket. The issue of
Lugo's
liability was rehashed on several occasions throughout the course of
litigation, as noted in the court's November 11, 2005 Amended Opinion and
Order, denying Defendants' final motion for reconsideration.
In addition,
the order again addressed the Sala Stipulation and the Rule 1006
summaries. Although neither party had complied with the court's
alternative method of submitting the Rule 1006 evidence, the court
granted them another twenty days to file their offers of proof on the ADV
issue. The court also reminded Defendants that "[t]he Sala
Stipulation was bilateral and had a 'quid pro quo' for the employer,
because the Department of Labor, as part of the announced stipulation,
agreed that Defendants had been in compliance since October[]
1995." Defendants finally submitted the Rule 1006 summaries on July
17, 2003, and various memoranda and supplemental filings by both parties
followed.
After
further hearings, the district court entered judgment in favor of the
Secretary on October 31, 2003. The accompanying Opinion & Order
denied a number of "Rule 50 Motions" filed by Defendants over
the course of the proceedings, the most relevant to this appeal being a
motion not normally thought of as within the compass of Rule 50 -- a
motion to reconsider the court's denial of Defendants' July 13, 1998
motion for summary judgment on the ADV issue. The opinion also once again
explained the history of both the Sala Stipulation and the issue of Lugo's personal
liability as an employer. The court noted that its grant of partial
summary judgment on Lugo's status was
further supported by Defendants' admissions at trial that "Lugo had ultimate
control over [Oasis]'s operations, and over employment practices."
On June
21, 2005, the court amended the judgment, ordering Oasis to pay
$141,270.64 in back wages and an equal amount in liquidated damages to
282 current and former employees. Oasis filed one last motion for
reconsideration on July 1, 2005, asking the court to reconsider its
decisions on liquidated damages and Lugo's
personal liability as an employer. The district court issued an amended
opinion and order on November 1, 2005, denying the motion for
reconsideration on the ground that Defendants were merely rehashing old
arguments. Defendants appeal from the final judgment and from the court's
denial of their last motion for reconsideration.
II. Discussion
Defendants raise three issues on appeal. First, they claim that
the district court should have set aside the Sala Stipulation and allowed
them to prove the ADV defense at trial. Second, they challenge the
district court's finding that Lugo
is personally liable as an employer under the FLSA. Third, they argue
that the district court erred in awarding liquidated damages based on
willfulness. We address each issue in turn.
A. Sala Stipulation
The
district court refused to set aside the Sala Stipulation based on the
general principle that "stipulations of attorneys made during a
trial may not be disregarded or set aside at will." T I Fed. Credit
Union v. DelBonis, 72 F.3d 921, 928 (1st Cir. 1995) (quoting Marshall v. Emersons
Ltd., 593 F.2d 565, 569 (4th Cir. 1979)); see also Rosario-Díaz v.
González, 140 F.3d 312, 315 (1st Cir. 1998) ("Attorneys represent
clients, and as a general rule an attorney's blunder binds her
client."). As the district court correctly noted, stipulations are
highly favored in our judicial system as a means of "expedit[ing] a
trial and eliminat[ing] the necessity of much tedious proof." T I
Fed. Credit Union, 72 F.3d at 928 (quoting Burstein v. United States, 232 F.2d 19,
23 (8th Cir. 1956)). Once entered, parties are "not generally free
to extricate themselves . . . [unless] 'it becomes apparent that it may
inflict a manifest injustice upon one of the contracting parties.'" Id. (quoting Marshall,
593 F.2d at 568). Accordingly, "a party may be relieved of a
stipulation for good cause -- which means, in a nutshell, that good
reason must exist and that relief must not unfairly prejudice the
opposing party or the interests of justice." Am. Honda Motor Co. v.
Richard Lundgren, Inc., 314 F.3d 17, 21 (1st Cir. 2002). One "good
reason" for setting aside a stipulation is "where it becomes
evident that 'the agreement was made under a clear mistake.'" T I
Fed. Credit Union, 72 F.3d at 928 (quoting Brast v. Winding Gulf Colliery
Co., 94 F.2d 179, 181 (4th Cir. 1938) (setting aside a stipulation as to
tax liability where the calculation had been based on a misunderstanding
of law)).
Here, the district court gave
Defendants an opportunity to prove that the stipulation was based on a
mistake, but Defendants failed to make the required showing.
Defendants argued that the district court misplaced
the burden of proof on the ADV issue, by requiring Defendants to prove a
lack of coverage. Defendants, however, stipulated that Oasis's ADV met
the statutory threshold, and the district court affirmed the stipulation,
which relieved the Secretary of her burden to prove FLSA coverage. See, e.g.,
Eng'g Contractors Ass'n of S. Fla., Inc.
v. Metro. Dade
County, 122 F.3d
895, 905 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(3)).
The burden was then properly on Defendants to show good cause for setting
aside the stipulation. See Cabán Hernández v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., --
F.3d --, No. 06-1968, 2007 WL 1248414, at *3 (1st Cir. 2007) ("The
appellants have shown nothing that would constitute good cause or
otherwise justify relief from the stipulation.").
Defendants do
not challenge the district court's rulings with respect to the
inadmissibility of the Rule 1006 summaries Defendants complain that they
did not get a hearing on the Rule1006 evidence, as promised by the court.
Defendants did not, however, oppose the Secretary's motion to preclude them
from offering any evidence contrary to the stipulation, which rendered
the Rule 1006 evidence unnecessary. Moreover, Defendants then agreed to
file a joint proffer of evidence in lieu of a hearing or the expert evidence presented
with their ill-timed summary judgment motion. We have scoured the record,
and, like the district court, we find no indication of any properly
supported arguments that Oasis did not meet the ADV threshold.
Alternatively, Defendants argue that the Sala Stipulation is procedurally
invalid because it was not in writing or signed by the parties. They
assert that stipulations between attorneys are not binding unless the
represented parties assent to the stipulation, and that stipulations
usually must be in writing unless made in open court. Defendants also
posit that stipulations must be signed by all parties when required by
local rules, citing Cavallini v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co., 44
F.3d 256, 266 (5th Cir. 1995) (applying Tex. R. Civ. P. 11). The District
Court for the District of Puerto Rico, however, has no specific rule
requiring all agreements between parties to be in writing. Note, however, that Local Rule 16(j)(2) does specifically require stipulations extending
discovery deadlines to be in writing. The st rule otherwise on point is
Local Rule 11,which requires that all documents
submitted to the court be signed by an attorney or pro se litigant.
In any
event, the district court memorialized the Sala Stipulation -- entered
into by the attorneys at a pre-trial status conference before the
district court judge -- in a September 16, 1996 order. Defendants did not
object to the order, move to strike the reference to the stipulation, or
request reconsideration. The order then became the law of the case, and
any formalities suggested by Defendants with respect to the stipulation
were rendered moot. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(e) ("After any conference
held pursuant to this rule, an order shall be entered reciting the action
taken. This order shall control the subsequent course of the action
unless modified by a subsequent order.").
Finally, Defendants attack the subject matter jurisdiction of the
court, arguing that the parties cannot stipulate to ADV coverage because
it is a jurisdictional requirement of the FLSA. See Aponte v. Tabares,
114 F.3d 1169, 1997 WL 235473, at *1 (1st Cir. 1997) (unpublished
opinion) ("Limits on subject matter jurisdiction are not waivable
and, therefore, may be raised at any time."). This argument fails,
however, because ADV coverage is not jurisdictional. As the Supreme Court
recently noted, "Subject matter jurisdiction in federal-question
cases is sometimes erroneously conflated with a plaintiff's need and
ability to prove the defendant bound by the federal law asserted as the
predicate for relief -- a merits-related determination." Arbaugh v.
Y & H Corp., 546 U.S.
500, 511 (2006) (quoting 2 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice § 12.30[1] (3d
ed. 2005)). To mitigate this confusion, the Court provided clear guidance
for distinguishing between the two concepts: "[W]hen Congress does
not rank a statutory limitation on coverage as jurisdictional,
courts should treat the restriction as nonjurisdictional in
character." Id.
at 515. The FLSA places the ADV limitation in the definitions section of
the Act, and does not suggest that the ADV limitation is jurisdictional.
See 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(s)(1)(a), 216. We therefore
treat it as an element of the claim. Cf. Fernández v. Centerplate/NBSE,
441 F.3d 1006, 1009 (D.C. Cir. 2006) ("While the merits of
Fernandez's FLSA claim turn on whether she was paid for hours worked in
excess of forty per week, nothing in the FLSA suggests that a failure to
prove this particular element of her cause of action requires a dismissal
for lack of jurisdiction."); Minard v. ITC Deltacom Commc'ns, Inc.,
447 F.3d 352, 356 (5th Cir. 2006) ("In light of the Supreme Court's
decision in Arbaugh, we conclude that the definition section of the
[Family Medical Leave Act] . . . is a substantive ingredient of a
plaintiff's claim for relief, not a jurisdictional limitation.").
As
Defendants have not established good cause for setting aside the Sala
Stipulation, we find no abuse of discretion in the district court's
decision to hold Defendants to their agreement.
B. Employer Liability
Defendants next challenge the district court's grant of partial
summary judgment on the issue of Lugo's
personal liability as an employer, arguing that the FLSA does not contemplate
holding corporate officers individually liable for the corporation's
statutory violations. We review a district court's grant of summary
judgment de novo, viewing the summary judgment record in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party. Vasapolli v. Rostoff, 39 F.3d 27, 32
(1st Cir. 1994).
Under
the FLSA, an "employer" is "any person acting directly or
indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an
employee." 29 U.S.C. § 203(d). The First Circuit has followed the Supreme
Court's lead in interpreting this definition pursuant to an
"economic reality" analysis. Donovan v. Agnew, 712 F.2d 1509,
1510 (1st Cir. 1983) (citing Goldberg v. Whitaker, 366 U.S. 28, 33 (1961)).
Accordingly, there may be multiple "employers" who are
simultaneously liable for compliance with the FLSA. Id.; Baystate Alternative Staffing,
Inc. v. Herman, 163 F.3d 668, 675 (1st Cir. 1998).
In
Donovan v. Agnew, we acknowledged that "[t]he overwhelming weight of
authority is that a corporate officer with operational control of a
corporation's covered enterprise is an employer along with the
corporation, jointly and severally liable under the FLSA for unpaid
wages." 712 F.2d at 1511 (collecting cases). Although we found it
"difficult to accept . . . that Congress intended that any corporate
officer or other employee with ultimate operational control over payroll
matters be personally liable," id. at 1513 (emphasis added), we
narrowly determined that the FLSA did not preclude personal liability for
"corporate officers with a significant ownership interest who had
operational control of significant aspects of the corporation's day to
day functions, including compensation of employees, and who personally
made decisions to continue operations despite financial adversity during
the period of nonpayment," id. at 1514.
We next
visited the issue of an individual's personal liability under the FLSA
for corporate employment practices in Baystate Alternative Staffing, 163
F.3d 668. There, the Department of Labor's Administrative Review Board
had held two corporate officers and managers personally liable for FLSA
violations because "they had the authority to manage certain aspects
of the business's operations on a day-to-day basis." Id. at 678. Noting
our concern in Agnew that not every corporate employee who exercised
supervisory control should be held personally liable, we identified
several factors that were important to the personal liability analysis,
including the individual's ownership interest, degree of control over the
corporation's financial affairs and compensation practices, and role in
"caus[ing] the corporation to compensate (or not to compensate)
employees in accordance with the FLSA." Id. We remanded the personal liability
issue in that case based on the Board's failure to address "the
[individuals'] personal responsibility for making decisions about the
conduct of the business that contributed to the violations of the
Act." Id.
Based
on the above considerations, we affirm the district court's judgment
holding Lugo
personally liable for Oasis's compensation decisions. Lugo was not just any employee with
some supervisory control over other employees. He was the president of
the corporation, and he had ultimate control over the business's
day-to-day operations. In particular, it is undisputed that Lugo was the
corporate officer principally in charge of directing employment
practices, such as hiring and firing employees, requiring employees to
attend meetings unpaid, and setting employees' wages and schedules. He
was thus instrumental in "causing" the corporation to violate
the FLSA. See id.; see also Donovan v. Sabine Irrigation Co., 695 F.2d
190, 194-95 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding corporate president who dominated
employment practices liable under FLSA). The FLSA contemplates, at least
in certain circumstances, holding officers with such personal
responsibility for statutory compliance jointly and severally liable
along with the corporation.
Neither party discusses Lugo's ownership interest in Oasis. In
this case, however, Lugo's
personal responsibility outweighs any ownership considerations. See
Agnew, 712 F.2d at 1511 (citing Sabine Irrigation Co., 695 F.2d at
194-95, for the proposition thata corporate officer may be held liable
even if he has no ownership interest).
See Agnew, 712 F.2d at 1510.
C. Liquidated Damages
Finally, Defendants argue that the district court erred in
awarding liquidated damages based on a finding of willfulness. The FLSA
authorizes the Secretary of Labor to recover on behalf of employees unpaid wages and overtime compensation plus
an equal amount in liquidated damages. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), (c). The only
way an employer can escape liquidated damages is to "show[] to the satisfaction of the court" that it
acted in good faith and had reasonable grounds for believing that its
acts did not violate the FLSA. Id.
§ 260. Because the FLSA leaves the decision to depart from the norm of
awarding double damages to the district court, see, e.g., Herman v. RSR
Sec. Servs. Ltd., 172 F.3d 132, 142 (2d Cir. 1999), we review only for
abuse of discretion, McLaughlin v. Hogar San José, Inc., 865 F.2d 12, 14
(1st Cir. 1989). The employer's burden on appeal is especially difficult
because we review the district court's factual findings related to good
faith and reasonableness for clear error. See id. ("The district
court's findings of good faith and reasonable grounds are mixed questions
of law and fact, which are subject to the strict standard of review of
Rule 52(a).").
Here,
the district court found that Defendants failed to show good faith or
objective reasonableness, referring back to its findings on willfulness
with respect to the applicable statute of limitations. See Reich v.
Newspapers of New Eng., Inc., 44 F.3d 1060, 1079 (1st Cir. 1995)
("The FLSA imposes a two-year statute of limitations unless the
violations are shown to be willful, in which case a three-year period
applies." (citing 29 U.S.C. § 255(a))). For statute of limitation
purposes, the court found, inter alia, that Defendants
"intentionally and consistently failed to keep accurate records of
the time worked by its employees[,] . . . disguised minimum wage, as well
as overtime pay violations, . . . did not record the amounts of cash
tips[,] . . . [and] most salient . . . [to] a finding of willfulness, . .
. [paid] employee 'off the books.'"
The
district court's willfulness findings are not clearly erroneous, and they
adequately support the court's decision to award liquidated damages. Oasis's
failure to keep adequate payroll records and its intentional manipulation
of the records it did keep are sufficient grounds for concluding that
Oasis did not act in good faith or with a reasonable belief that it was
in compliance with the FLSA. Cf. Elwell v. Univ. Hosps. Home Care Servs.,
276 F.3d 832, 844 (6th Cir. 2002) ("[T]he fact that an employer
knowingly under-reported its employee's work hours could suggest to a
[fact finder] that the employer was attempting to conceal its failure to
pay overtime from regulators, or was acting to eliminate evidence that
might later be used against it in a suit by one of its employees.").
Moreover, a finding of willfulness means that "the employer either
knew or showed reckless disregard for the matter of whether its conduct
was prohibited by the statute." McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486
U.S.
128, 133 (1988).
Defendants' primary argument on appeal is that the court had
indicated at trial that the willfulness issue was "" and that
the Secretary had offered no evidence that Oasis acted in reckless
disregard of its statutory obligations. Cf. López v. Corporación
Azucarera de P.R., 938 F.2d 1510, 1515 (1st Cir. 1991) ("Plaintiffs
herein have proffered no evidence indicating that [the employer] acted with
knowledge or reckless disregard with respect to its obligations under FLSA. . . . Therefore, in the first instance, the
court holds that the two-year limitation term is applicable to this
case."). These arguments are unpersuasive. First, the district court
noted its "initial inclination against a determination of
willfulness," but explained that it ultimately relied on the
employees' testimony and Defendants' own documentary evidence to reach
its conclusion regarding willfulness. We have already determined that the
willfulness finding is not clearly erroneous.
Some circuits have held that a finding of willfulness
precludes a district court's decision not to award liquidated damages,
see e.g., Brinkman v. Dep't of Corr., 21 F.3d 370, 372-73 (10th Cir.1994),
but we need not go so far, see Jarrett v. ERC Props., Inc.,211 F.3d 1078,
1084 (8th Cir. 2000).
Furthermore, it is the employer's burden to show good faith and
objective reasonableness, see 29 U.S.C. § 260, and therefore the Secretary's
alleged failure to offer evidence of willfulness is not an impediment to
the court's decision to refrain from awarding liquidated damages. The
district court found that Defendants failed to meet their burden, and,
again, that finding is not clearly erroneous. We therefore find no abuse
of discretion in the district court's award of liquidated damages.
III. Conclusion
For the
foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment against Defendants.
Affirmed.
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